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ARTICLE 9: WHAT IT DOES FOR THE PAST
Grant Gilmore*
Article 9 is said to be the most novel, even the most revolu-
tionary, part of the Code. This is a good deal more nearly true
of its form than of its substance. Like any statute, it stands
firmly rooted in the past, peering uncertainly toward the future.
In my first lecture I shall talk mostly of what the article
accomplishes - its relatively satisfactory resolution of past con-
troversies. In the second lecture I shall be mostly concerned with
what the article does not accomplish - with the questions it does
not answer and the problems it does not solve. Today we shall
look backward, which is no great trick. Tomorrow we shall look,
as through a glass darkly, toward what lies ahead.
Perhaps I should start with a word of explanation - not of
apology - for taking up half my time with you in merely tracing
the road along which we have come to get to where we are.
Surely the principal function of a Code is to abolish the past.
At least a common lawyer assumes that that was the theory on
which the great civil law codes were based. From the date of
the Code's enactment, the pre-Code law is no longer available
as a source of law. The gaps, the ambiguities, the unforeseen
situations cannot be referred for decision to the accumulated
wisdom of the past. There is a fresh start, a new universe of
legal discourse, in which the only permissible way of solving a
problem is to find (or pretend to find) the answer in the un-
defiled, the unconstrued, the uncontaminated text of the Code
itself. How well the theory worked in practice, or whether it
worked at all, you, as civilians, are much better equipped to say
than I.
The Uniform Commercial Code, so-called, is not that sort of
Code- even in theory. It derives from the common law, not
the civil law, tradition. We shall do better to think of it as a big
statute - or a collection of statutes bound together in the same
*Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
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book - which goes as far as it goes and no further. It assumes
the continuing existence of a large body of pre-Code and non-
Code law on which it rests for support, which it displaces to
the least possible extent, and without which it could not survive.
The solid stuff of pre-Code law will furnish the rationale of
decision quite as often as the Code's own gossamer substance.
The idea of using personal property as security for debt in
any other way than by its simple delivery in pledge is not an old
one. We need look no further back than the first half of the
nineteenth century for the filing statutes which authorized mort-
gages of chattels with the mortgagor remaining in possession
throughout the loan period or until default. The only statutory
contribution at this point was the establishment of a filing or
recording system under which public notice of the mortgagee's
interest through a public record was substituted, as a validating
or perfecting device, for the pledgee's traditional possession.
The development of the substantive content of the new law of
nonpossessory security interests in personal property was left
to judicial improvisation. No doubt it was assumed, to the extent
that anyone gave thought to the problem, that the law of real
property mortgages and the law of pledge would provide the
necessary guides of helpful analogy. But a mortgage of Black-
acre presents problems quite different from those presented by
a mortgage of a business enterprise's equipment, inventory or
receivables. And property safely in a pledgee's possession is not
at all the same thing as the same property in the borrower's
possession. The analogies drawn from the law of pledge and
mortgage proved to be feeble reeds to lean on.
We are accustomed to the idea that the nineteenth century
attempt to create a stable structure of personal property security
law by judicial, as opposed to legislative, fiat had, by the end
of the century, foundered in an immense confusion. The attempt
failed, it is true, but it came close to succeeding. Except for one
controversy, which was never resolved within the framework
of the nineteenth century structure, it quite probably would
have succeeded.
In Swift v. Tyson,' Justice Story announced the doctrine of a
general federal commercial law, independent of state law. In
this, as in many of his other great decisions, Story was the
apostle- with a little more luck, he could have been the archi-
1. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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tect- of a nationally uniform commercial law. We know of
Swift v. Tyson only in its disreputable old age- a toothless
and unlovely hag. We forget that for half a century or more
the doctrine of the general federal commercial law worked very
well indeed. Even the discovery, which was made twenty years
or so after the doctrine was promulgated, that the federal courts
were bound by state statutes even though they were not bound
by state decisional law, made very little difference, since com-
mercial law on any level remained uncodified well into this cen-
tury.
In those days the Supreme Court of the United States was a
great commercial court and, under its guidance, the lower fed-
eral courts did their work well. It was the Supreme Court which
established the effectiveness of after-acquired property clauses
in corporate financing - first in railroad mortgages and later,
as the court put it, "in other similar great and important enter-
prises of the day."'2 It was the Supreme Court which later
worked out the intricate matter of the priority for purchase
money financing over the after-acquired property interest: once
again the progression was from the financing of railroad equip-
ment - the rolling stock - to the financing of industrial equip-
ment used in connection with, or affixed to, real property. 3 And
even after the turn of the century it was a pair of Supreme
Court cases which set the pattern for the odd variant of inven-
tory financing which came to be known as field warehousing. 4
In the several illustrations I have given you of the creative
role which the Supreme Court played in the development of per-
sonal property security law from 1850 until after 1900, the court
did not announce - or did not quite announce - what today we
would call a rule of federal law. It was, in fact, dealing with
issues which the state courts had wrestled with inconclusively.
It was imposing - or suggesting - a pattern of order to replace
the prevailing chaos. There are intimations in some of the opin-
ions that if an overriding rule of federal law were needed, the
2. See Pennock v. Coe, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 117, 130 (1860).
3. The basic railroad case was United States v. New Orleans R.R., 79 U.S.(12,Wall.) 362 (1871). The two leading Supreme Court cases on industrial
equipment financing were Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914); Detroit Steel
Cooperage Co. v. Sistersville Brewing Co., 233 U.S. 712 (1914). The develop-
ments briefly referred to here are reviewed in 2 GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS
IN PERSONAL PROPERTY c. 28 (1965). An earlier version of the chapter referred
to appeared as The Purchase Money Priority, 76 HARV. LAw REv. 1333 (1963).
4. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 198 U.S. 530 (1905) ; Security Warehousing
Co. v. Hand, 206 U.S. 415 (1907).
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rule would be forthcoming. But the court seems to have been
sensitive to the felt needs of the time. It led and the state courts,
with the state legislatures not infrequently playing a supporting
role, followed.
To this pattern of a smooth and orderly development, there
was one major exception- one issue which found the state
courts arrayed in opposing camps and the federal courts un-
able to produce a solution around which a new consensus could
form. The failure to resolve this single issue eventually brought
the whole structure crashing down.
The point of breakdown was the apparently simple problem
of devising a satisfactory method of financing on the security
of a merchant's stock in trade or a manufacturer's inventory.
From the beginnings - that is, from 1830 to 1840 - one group
of state courts held that inventory mortgages were necessarily,
and as matter of law, fraudulent. Another group of courts held
that, in the absence of a showing of actual fraud or dishonesty,
such mortgages represented entirely legitimate transactions. In
the 1870's the Supreme Court of the United States, aligning
itself with the "fraud in law" forces, announced what sounded
suspiciously like a federal fraud in law rule, but, on this occasion,
the Justices were evidently out of touch with the real world
and not even the lower federal courts paid the least attention
to what they said.5 By the end of the century it had become a
popular sport with the writers of chattel mortgage treatises -
of which there were many - to draw up lists of "fraud in law"
states and "fraud in fact" states. If the treatise writer looked
on the inventory mortgage as a wicked engine of fraud, his list
would show a great many fraud in law states and only a few
fraud in fact states. If he found the inventory mortgage to be a
useful and praiseworthy financing device, his list would show
that the fraud in fact states far outnumbered the few states
which still clung to the discredited fraud in law doctrine.6 No-
5. The Supreme Court "fraud in law" case was Robinson v. Elliott, 89 U.S.
(22 Wall.) 513 (1874). In Brett v. Carter, 54 Fed. Cas. 67 (D. Mass. 1875),
Lowell, J., remarked that he doubted "both the generality and the justice of
the doctrine" of Robinson v. Elliott. In later cases the Supreme Court itself re-
ceded from the position it had apparently taken in Robinson v. Elliott. Michigan
and Iowa rules under which stock in trade mortgages were valid were approved
in Peoples Savings Bank v. Bates, 120 U.S. 556 (1887) (Michigan) ; Etheridge
v. Sperry, 139 U.S. 266 (1891) (Iowa).
6. See JONEs, MORTGAGES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 415 (4th ed. 1894);
PIERCE, FRAUDULENT MORTGAGES OF MERCHANDISE, cc. 3-7 (1892); 1 COBBEY,
CHATEL MORTGAGES § 309 (1893).
[Vol. XXVI
ARTICLE 9: WHAT IT DOES
body could be sure of anything and inventory financing in any
state was a doubtful gamble.
But what was the fraud? The underlying idea -which de-
rived quite directly from a decision of the Star Chamber in
1601, reported by Lord Coke as Twyne's Case7 - was that there
was a fraud on creditors if the mortgagor was not only left in
possession of the mortgaged property but was allowed to use
it as if it were his own. That meant, in the context of an inven-
tory mortgage, that the mortgage was fraudulent if the mort-
gagor was allowed to sell the stock in the ordinary course of
his business without being under a duty to account to the mort-
gagee for the proceeds of sale. It is only by an accident of his-
tory or journalism that the word "fraud" got mixed up with all
this. A more neutral term like "invalid against creditors" would
very probably have simplified both the debate and the solution.
The solution, when it came, was the discovery, invention, or
spontaneous germination of a whole host of what we may call
inventory security devices- all of which begin to appear in the
case reports around 1900, all of which are alike in that their
principal claim to fame is that they are not chattel mortgages.
Some of these devices - like the security consignment - lodged
on barren ground, struggled for awhile and disappeared. Others
took root and flourished. Presently we had the trust receipt, the
factor's lien, and the field warehousing pledge - and what ap-
peared to be a new era in personal property security law, a sort
of late Byzantine era in which complexity for its own sake
became the craftsman's aim.
In time all these new devices, except the field warehousng
pledge which for a time escaped the common fate, passed under
the statutory yoke, were equipped with filing systems, had their
boundaries sharply defined, and acquired each its own distinc-
tive theology and ritual. The codification, if we should call it
that, of the personal property security devices was merely a
part of the general tendency, which established itself before
World War I and proceeded at a rapidly accelerating pace there-
after, to replace decisional law with a statutory formulation.8
A peculiarly fascinating example of that tendency is found, I
suggest, in the compulsion which induced the authors of the
7. 3 Co. Rep. 806, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber, 1601).
8. See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Ita Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
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so-called Restatements to reduce to black-letter text even those
segments of the common law which had remained uncodified.
The coming of the statutes marked the end of the once
promising attempt to build a nationally uniform system of com-
mercial law under the superintendence of the federal judiciary.
Perhaps the attempt would have failed in any case. At all events
the well-meant and largely successful labors of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws had, as
one of their incidental effects, the reduction of the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson to the state of toothless decrepitude we have pre-
viously deplored. The federal courts went out of the commer-
cial law business, apparently for good - although there is a
modern sequel which we will come across tomorrow.
We must return from our digression about statutes to pick
up the thread of our story, which we left with the dramatic
emergence of the inventory security devices. That extraordi-
nary solution of the great nineteenth century controversy was
achieved at the considerable cost of a fragmentation of security
law into a thing of bits and pieces. However, no matter how
great the price that must be paid, no war is ever really won.
Today's great victory is merely the prelude to tomorrow's grim
campaign. And so it was that when the financial community,
after a fifty year struggle, had reached the point where it had
become possible to make working capital loans safely on the
security of inventory, it suddenly became apparent that inven-
tory financing - except in a few situations, such as automobile
distribution - was not really desirable after all. Much better
than inventory, as security, were the receivables which arose
when the inventory was sold. That is an obvious proposition,
as soon as it is stated: if the borrower's default or insolvency
is assumed, the unsold inventory will in all probability be worth-
less; the receivables need only be collected. The baffling point is
why we hear nothing of anything like institutionalized receiv-
ables financing much before the 1920's. No doubt banking, like
law, has it own impenetrable mysteries.
Financing on the security of receivables - the short-term
receivables which arise when goods are sold or services rendered
on credit - presented exactly the same problem in the 1920's
that financing on the security of inventory had presented in
the 1870's. The controversy over receivables was an almost exact
replay - a sort of revival - of the controversy over the stock
[Vol. XXVI
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in trade mortgage. This time, however, the show, instead of
running for half a century, closed almost as soon as it opened.
The United States Supreme Court settled the issue in what
proved to be its last significant contribution to security law. In
Benedict v. Ratner,9 in which Justice Brandeis' opinion relied
almost exclusively on the nineteenth century stock in trade mort-
gage cases, the Court set aside in a bankruptcy proceeding a
receivables financing arrangement in which the assignor was
allowed to make collections of the assigned receivables and use
the proceeds for his own purposes without accounting for them
to the assignee.
In 1925, when the Benedict case was decided, an informed
observer might have predicted that what later came to be called
non-notification accounts receivable financing was dead. After
Benedict the only type of receivables financing that might have
seemed possible was one which had grown up in the textile in-
dustry and was known as "factoring." Textile factoring had in
its origins been inventory financing but had evolved into a
straight receivables arrangement. The accepted pattern was that
the invoices for goods shipped from the mill went out over the
factor's letterhead and the buyers or account debtors paid the
factor-assignee. Thus the money never got into the hands of the
mill owner-assignor, so that the arrangement was not vulnerable
under Benedict theory.
Our hypothetical observer would have been completely wrong
in his prediction. The so-called factoring arrangement did not
by any means disappear: it is still with us, it is no longer con-
fined to the textile industry, and it accounts for a volume of
several billion dollars worth of financing a year. But what hap-
pened, during the period after 1925, was a sensational growth
in non-notification receivables financing-that is, arrangements
in which the assignor continues to make the collections from
the account debtors, who are not notified that the accounts which
they owe have been assigned. 10 The post-Benedict arrangements
of this sort were, however, carried out in such a way that the
assignor was not allowed to exercise the "unfettered dominion"
9. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
10. It has been estimated that in recent years the annual volume of financing
done under "factoring" arrangements has been in the neighborhood of four billion
dollars and that the annual volume of non-notification accounts receivable fi-
nancing has been in the neighborhood of six billion dollars. Comment, Multistate




over the assigned accounts which Justice Brandeis had stigma-
tized as fraudulent. The accepted technique for complying with
the rule in Benedict was the use of a so-called revolving credit.
Strict accountability was imposed on the assignor, who was re-
quired to remit all collections to the assignee as they were re-
ceived - it is true that they were immediately, in the jargon of
the trade, re-remitted to the assignor. A constant ratio was
maintained between collateral and debt: if the aggregate value
of the assigned receivables decreased by twenty per cent, there
had to be a proportionate pay-down on the loan."
The complicated pattern of receivables financing which I
have just described bore a quite startling resemblance to the
techniques of inventory financing which had become customary
under the two most successful inventory security devices -the
trust receipt and the field warehousing pledge. In trust receipt
financing and in field warehousing, the borrower was held to
the strictest accountability. The most elaborate controls were set
up to insure that the automobile dealer did not sell his trust-
receipted cars out of trust - that is, without immediately re-
mitting the proceeds to the entruster - and that the borrower
did not withdraw goods from the field warehouse without
making a proportionate payment on the loan. The controls were
not, of course, always successful; the cars were sold out of trust
and the field warehouse was often empty when the holder of
the warehouse receipts came to look for his collateral. The rea-
son why you set up controls in the first place is that you know
you are operating in an area where fraud is endemic and in-
evitable. If you have the bad luck to lend thirty million dollars
to an unusually determined and ingenious crook, the controls
will do you no good and there will be no soy-bean oil in the tanks
when you go out to the New Jersey tank farm to look.
The specialists in inventory and receivables financing never
suggested that the rules they operated under should be relaxed.
This became clear during the 1940's when, for reasons which
are not germane to our discussion, most states enacted statutes
which regulated the assignment of accounts receivable. The
political situation was such that there is no doubt whatever that
the finance companies, who by this time were doing a large
volume of non-notification receivables financing, could have per-
11. Good examples from the recent case law of "how to comply with the rule
in Benedict" are In re New Haven Clock & Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir.
1958) ; Steven v. Union Trust Co., 316 F.2d 687 (DC. Cir. 1963).
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suaded the state legislatures to include in the accounts receivable
statutes provisions repealing the Benedict rule. They made no
attempt to do so. They had, it appears, become the most ardent
twentieth century supporters of the underlying principle which
runs from Twyne's Case through the nineteenth century inven-
tory mortgage cases to its ultimate formulation in Benedict v.
Ratner.
A student's first reaction to a study of personal property
security law during the first half of this century is that the fall
of the Roman Empire must have been much the same sort of
thing. There appears to be a process of disorganization, dissolu-
tion, disintegration at work. With the appearance of each new
independent security device, with the piling of each new statute
on the untidy heap, the picture appears to grow more confused
and more obscure. I shall suggest, however, that the apparent
triumph of a truly barbarous diversity concealed, for a time,
the edification of a remarkably unified structure of law - as a
scaffolding conceals a building in course of construction.
I have already commented on the startling similarity of the
patterns or techniques that emerged both in inventory and re-
ceivables financing. I shall cite another example of the unity-
in-diversity theme, which is even more dramatic. In most states,
during the nineteenth century, the conditional sale or an analo-
gous device had appeared as a competitor to the older chattel
mortgage. In its origins the conditional sale, or sale on condi-
tion, derived from a conceptual system which had no contact
whatever with mortgage theory; indeed the conditional sale was
not, to start with, a security device at all. As we came down into
this century, the two competing devices almost everywhere
merged and fused. Where the conditional sale was not turned
into the equivalent of the chattel mortgage by legislation, it
gradually became so by a case law development. All that re-
mained to distinguish them was the terminology and the un-
fortunate fact that, although in most states both the conditional
sale contract and the chattel mortgage had to be filed, they were
usually filed in different books, set up according to different
theories, and kept in different places. Indeed the multiplication
of filing systems, which we might with a degree of paradox
describe as both unnecessary and inevitable, was the one really




I should also like to draw to your attention one significant
result of the historical process which I have been describing
and distorting for you during the past half hour. That is, that
financing on the security of the short-term or liquid assets -
the inventory and receivables - of a business enterprise had
become permanently divorced from financing on the security
of the long-term or fixed assets - the plant and equipment.
After 1910 or so, the security for the bonds issued under the
typical corporate indenture never included the inventory or the
receivables. Those short-term, liquid, and highly volatile assets
went up as security for working capital loans made by specialists
under the complicated procedures of revolving credits and the
like. Those procedures guaranteed that the lender who took
such dangerous and doubtful collateral as security would keep a
close watch on his borrower's affairs - would be, in the odd
term which came into use, the borrower's policeman.
I started by saying that article 9 has been described as a
revolutionary departure and went on to comment that the de-
scription was more apt with respect to the article's terminology,
which is novel, than with respect to its substance, which is not.
Perhaps, in law as in politics, what appears to be a revolution is
merely the recognition de lure of what has long since taken
place de facto. All the article 9 draftsmen really had to do was
to tear down the scaffolding and reveal the building. Their only
real contribution, which was simple, obvious, and as easy as
rolling off a log, was to substitute a single filing system for the
half-dozen systems which had grown up in most states under
the pre-Code security statutes.
Naturally, the draftsmen - I happened to be one of them -
did not, when they set about their task in the late 1940's, see
matters in quite that clear, Olympian light. While you are climb-
ing the mountain, you are greatly impressed at your own forti-
tude and ingenuity in overcoming obstacles. When you reach
the top, the thought may occur to you that you really haven't
come so far after all.
The basic idea for what became article 9 had apparently
occurred independently to several of us. That was that there
should be a single, comprehensive statute which would cover all
types of personal property security transactions, regardless of
the form in which they were cast. Instead of chattel mortgages,
conditional sales, trust receipts, and so on, there was to be a
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unitary "security interest" in personal property, tangible and
intangible. The original project, however, contemplated a five-
part division of the statute according to what were conceived
to be significantly different types of financing transactions.
In early drafts, therefore, there were separate parts on Inven-
tory and Accounts Receivable Financing; Industrial Equipment
Financing; Agricultural Financing; Consumer Goods Financing;
and Pledge. Indeed, a sixth part, on long-term contract rights
financing as distinguished from short-term accounts receivable
financing, was projected but never reached draft stage. As the
early drafts progressed, each of the separate parts tended to
become more and more nearly a Chinese copy of each of the
other parts. Evidently the assumption that there were signifi-
cant differences in the various types of financing transactions
which had been singled out for separate treatment had been
erroneous. Finally the original scheme of organization was
scrapped and the article was redrafted as a single unit. The
division into five parts remained, but the parts now dealt with
such matters as Formal Requisites, Attachment and Perfection,
Priorities, Filing and Default. The only residue from the origi-
nal plan was the retention of an elaborate series of definitions
which classify all types of personal property into four categories
of goods- inventory, equipment, farm products, and consumer
goods- three categories of what might be called pledgeable
intangibles- instruments, documents, and chattel paper- and
three categories of pure or non-pledgeable intangibles - ac-
counts, contract rights, and general intangibles. 1 2 The original
drafting scheme had required most of this complicated classifica-
tion. When the structure of the article was simplified, most of
the categories could have been dropped. Unfortunately, by that
time the drafting staff had become so accustomed to finding its
way through the definitional jungle that it never occurred to any-
body that it would be helpful to simplify the terminology as well
as the structure.
The simplest way of explaining what article 9 does is to say
that it accepts the verdict of history. It provides that any type
of personal property, tangible or intangible, can be used as col-
lateral to secure a loan. It reduces to a minimum the formal
requisites for creation of a security interest. It introduces a
greatly simplied filing system. With respect to default rights,
it adopts what had become the universal pattern of security law:
12. For the definitions, see §§ 9-105, 9-106, 9-109.
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the normal procedure on default is for the secured party to sell
the collateral and apply the proceeds to the expenses of sale and
satisfaction of the secured obligation; the debtor is entitled to
any surplus and is liable for any deficiency.
One unanticipated consequence of the structure of the article
was that it imposed on the draftsmen an enormously complex
treatment of the problem of priorities among security interests.
Take, for example, the financing of the acquisition of a million
dollars worth of new equipment by a corporation which has
already given a mortgage on all its plant and equipment, includ-
ing all property to be acquired during the term of the mortgage.
It will be impossible for the corporation to purchase the new
equipment unless it can give the purchase money financer a
security interest which has priority over the claim of the bond-
holders under the after-acquired property clause of the mort-
gage. Under pre-Code law, the purchase money priority was
worked out by a juggling manipulation of lien and title theory.
The new equipment was financed under a title-retention device
-the conditional sale or the so-called equipment trust. The re-
sult was priority for the purchase money financing- the new
money- since (or so the conceptual explanation ran) title to
the new equipment was never transferred to the mortgagor cor-
poration and therefore there was nothing for the lien of the
mortgage to attach to. The article 9 draftsmen had no quarrel
with the doctrine of purchase money priority but, having adopted
the idea of a unitary security interest, there was no way of solv-
ing the problem by the pre-Code title-lien distinction.' 3 The
problem had to be handled as one of priorities between after-
acquired property interests and purchase money interests (which
required still another definition of what a "purchase money
security interest" was) .14 I am afraid that the draftsmen, hav-
ing whetted their appetite on a few obvious priority problems
like that of purchase money financing, went on to devour all the
priority problems in sight and a few more that had never been
seen or even imagined before. After awhile priorities get to be
an addiction like cocaine or heroin.
13. Section 9-202 provides: "Each provision of this Article with regard to
rights, obligations and remedies applies whether title to collateral is in the secured
party or in the debtor."
14. For the definition of "purchase money security interest," see § 9-107. The
priorities 'between purchase money and non-purchase money security interests are
worked out in § 9-312(3), (4).
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Article 9 contains the most forthright repealer of the domin-
ion rule of Benedict v. Ratner which the wit and industry of
the draftsmen could put together.
Section 9-205 provides that:
"A security interest is not invalid or fraudulent against
creditors by reason of liberty in the debtor to use, commingle
or dispose of all or part of the collateral (including returned
or repossessed goods) or to collect or compromise accounts,
contract rights or chattel paper, or to accept the return of
goods, or to use, commingle or dispose of proceeds, or by rea-
son of the failure of the secured party to require the debtor
to account for proceeds or replace collateral."
Clearly the draftsmen were not niggardly in their use of words
- the sentence rolls on like some great Niagara of jargon - but
there can be no doubt that, after three hundred and sixty-odd
years, Twyne's Case is dead as a doornail.
But who wanted to kill Twyne's Case? A little earlier I de-
scribed the inventory and receivables financing patterns whose
use is thought to have been compelled by the theory of Twyne's
Case and its twentieth century reformulation in Benedict. I as-
sume that I left you with the impression that I thought they were
good and desirable patterns. I also commented on the fact that
during the 1940's the finance companies, which had become the
leading specialists in both inventory and receivables financing,
made no attempt to have the rule in Benedict repealed when they
could easily have done so. In this instance we know perfectly
well who killed Cock Robin. The question is: why did they?
As one of the murderers, now getting on in years, I some-
times wonder - sitting before my fire in the evening - whether
what we did was quite right. No doubt the regicide judges who
signed the death warrant for King Charles I put similar ques-
tions to themselves in later years. It was a difficult situation.
There were many arguments both ways. Perhaps a less extreme
solution might have worked. Perhaps not.
There are two thoughts which somewhat console me.
One is that it is not unreasonable to say that article 9 abol-
ishes the dominion rule only in its formal aspects and preserves
its substance. Closely related to the Benedict repealer which I
have read to you is a complicated provision, which I shall not
1966]
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read to you, in section 9-306 which deals with a secured party's
right to "proceeds" -the receivables which arise when inven-
tory is sold and the money which comes in when the receivables
are collected. These are the direct or immediate security in re-
ceivables financing and the real security - the only source from
which the lender will ever be repaid - in inventory financing.
The section 9-306 proceeds provision says in substance that if
insolvency proceedings are instituted against the debtor, the only
proceeds which the secured party can claim are those which the
debtor received during the ten days preceding the institution of
the proceeding less whatever was actually paid over to the se-
cured party during the same period. Thus, in the one contin-
gency where the secured party will need his collateral, section
9-306 puts beyond his reach anything he has allowed the debtor
to keep and use for more than the ten days before bankruptcy
day. The Code secured party thus is provided with a consider-
able incentive to continue the policing practices which his pre-
Code counterparts developed.
The second thought which consoles me is that, if all speed
limits were removed on the highways, it does not necessarily
follow that people will start driving at 100 miles an hour along
winding, two-lane country roads. The repealer of Benedict, the
murder of Twyne's Case, were acts decided upon after lenders
had had fifty years of experience in finding out how security-
like inventory and receivables ought to be handled. No profes-
sional whom I have talked to in the last fifteen years has ever
expressed the slightest interest in taking advantage of the Code's
lowering of barriers. Once a policeman, always a policeman.
The danger is, of course, that amateurs may be tempted to get
into the act -although that does not seem to have happened,
to any appreciable extent, in the states which have lived with the
Code for up to ten years.
I noted earlier that one of the odd results of our history was
the divorcement of long-term financing on the fixed assets of
an enterprise from short-term financing on the security of its
inventory and receivables. Under article 9 the divorcement is no
longer required as matter of law. There is nothing to prevent
the draftsman of corporate indentures in Code states from reach-
ing out to cover the inventory and receivables as well as the
plant and equipment. There is no reason why they should and
it should be remembered that, if they were to do such a thing,
the bondholders would take subject to the priority for subsequent
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purchase money interests in both equipment and inventory as
well as to the limitation on a proceeds claim in insolvency pro-
ceedings. I will admit, however, that this possibility worries me
more than the idea that amateurs will start making unpoliced
inventory and receivables loans. I think that the divorcement
between long-term and short-term financing, with the segrega-
tion of the fixed assets from the quick assets, has been a desir-
able feature of our security law, no matter for what strange
reasons it was arrived at. I have come to feel that, with a little
more ingenuity or a better reading of history, we might have
done more than in fact we did to preserve this remote descendant
of Twyne's Case.
Article 9 is sometimes described as a "floating lien" statute.
In common law parts, those are, or once were, fighting words -
although people seem to be getting used to the idea that it is
respectable for a lien to float in the United States, as it has
long done in England and Canada. Insofar as "floating lien"
is a meaningful term, the reference is principally to those as-
pects of the article 9 security interest which we have mentioned:
the validation of the after-acquired property interest and the
repeal of the rule of Benedict v. Ratner. Article 9 does make it
possible for a lender to take a security interest in all of a debtor's
present and future property, advance his money, sit back and
take no further interest in what goes on. He will not be well
advised to do this. This hypothetical course of action makes
little or no sense from a business or banking point of view. Fur-
thermore, it makes no sense because of some interesting and
curious developments connected with the surprising rebirth of
the general federal commercial law which we left for dead some
time back.
But that will be a part of our discussion tomorrow.
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